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Abstract 
While rotation strategies are important in determining agricultural commodity supply 
and environmental benefits from land use, little has been said about the economics of 
crop rotation. An issue when seeking to identify rotation dominance is whether yield and 
input-saving carry-over effects persist for one or more years. Focusing on length of carry-
over, expected profit maximization, and the monoculture decision, this paper develops 
principles concerning choice of rotation structure. For some rules that we develop, 
rotations may be discarded without reference to price levels while other rules require 
price data. We also show how risk aversion in the presence of price uncertainty can alter 
preferences over rotations. A further consideration in rotation choice is the allocation of 
time. The problem of crop choice to manage time commitments through the crop year is 
formally similar to that of crop choice to manage profit risk. 
 
Keywords: dominance, jointness, quasiconvexity, rotation algebra, specialization, time 
rationing. 
 
JEL classification: D2, Q1, Q2 
  
ON MONOCULTURE AND THE STRUCTURE OF CROP ROTATIONS 
Introduction 
One of the defining features of crop agriculture throughout much of the world is the 
widespread practice of cropping in rotation. Crop rotations have been practiced since the 
beginning of agriculture, and some formal rules of thumb are known to have been prac-
ticed since medieval times. In order to support mixed farming and to avoid fouling fields, 
medieval estates in Sussex, England, applied a rotation of wheat, then barley (or oats), 
then legumes for sheep folding. These estates also grew intensive cereal crops followed 
by several years of grass (Brandon 1972). Variants of the Dutch/Norfolk system of cere-
als (wheat, barley, or oats) interspersed with dung-nourished turnips, grass, and legumes 
to support livestock and replenish the soil were used in much of northern Europe by 1700 
(Timmer 1969; Plumb 1952). 
Elsewhere in Europe, water was not as plentiful, and fallowing in rotation was the 
dominant cropping strategy through at least 1700. Newell (1973) and others hold that the 
replacement of fallow in rotation with forage crops during 1780-1850 was a major con-
tributor to agricultural productivity growth in France by supporting additional animals 
and enhancing soil fertility. And the introduction of sugar beet to Continental Europe dur-
ing the Napoleonic wars, to substitute for Caribbean sugarcane, required the practice of 
rotations of up to seven years (Poggi 1930). 
In the United States, too, crop rotation strategies have been an important determinant 
of regional and crop sector success. Rhode (1995) reports the demise of monoculture wheat 
in California, eventually to be replaced by more sustainable orchard crops and by horticul-
tural rotations. During the early part of the twentieth century, and partly in response to 
G.W. Carver’s work and advocacy at the Tuskegee Institute, much of the South moved 
from predominantly monoculture cotton to cotton-based rotations that included peanuts and 
potatoes. Windish (1981) provides a history of the introduction of the soybean into the 
Corn Belt, circa 1920. Sugar beet rotations similar to those in Europe were found to be suc-
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cessful in the Upper Midwest (Stilgenbauer 1927). Following the Dust Bowl in the south-
ern Great Plains, the predominant monoculture wheat sequence was replaced by various 
rotations that often include sorghum and fallow with wheat (Baumhardt 2003).  
Miller (2003) has documented growth in specialization on Iowa farms over the pe-
riod 1880-2000, attributing it largely to technological change with emphasis on scale 
economies and improved market inputs that substitute for rotation effects. The decline of 
horsepower, lower costs of trade, and increasing market access have also allowed for in-
creasing regional specialization. Within a region’s mainstay crops, however, rotation 
choice is likely to remain a key determinant of profitability because many motives for use 
of rotations are likely to persist. 
Campbell et al. (1990) provide a list of private motives for using rotations. These in-
clude strengthening resistance to soil erosion and soil degradation, improving soil tilth, 
and also conserving scarce soil moisture. All of these were important motives for Great 
Plains cropping system adjustments after the Dust Bowl. Soil erosion is among the most 
serious risks facing global cropland productivity (Pimentel et al. 1995), and land that is 
not desertified may require additional nutrient inputs to remain productive.  
Pests and diseases are important reasons for rotating through potatoes, cereals, and 
legumes when sugar beet is the primary crop (Poggi 1930; Stilgenbauer 1927; Cai et al. 
1997), for rotating soybean with corn (Miller 2003), and for including low-profit oats in 
wheat-based rotations (Campbell et al. 1990). In the case of sugar beet, nematodes can 
persist in the field for up to a decade, and nematicide use may not be permitted because 
of environmental side effects. Even if chemicals can control the problem, the approach 
introduces the risk of yield loss due to phytotoxic effects. As with the inclusion of soy-
beans in corn-based rotations, soil fertility can be enhanced by legume production and by 
incorporating cover crop organic matter residue into the soil. Organic matter also serves 
to protect the soil from erosion. Forage crops for grazing animals (turnips, or sugar beet 
tops as a by-product) can be important when seeking to access seasonally high prices and 
when alternative approaches to conserving feed are costly. 
Growers have also expressed direct interest in using rotations because the practice is 
held to be consistent with sustainability. This has become important beyond the expres-
sion of private values or the desire to protect asset value. Public policies in the United 
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States and in the European Union provide incentives to promote environmental goals, and 
market price premia are available for produce known to have been grown in a manner 
consistent with certain environmental standards. 
Risk and cashflow management can also rationalize the use of rotations (Collins and 
Barry 1986; Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein 1993). While crop prices do have a systematic 
component, it is not so strong as to marginalize the relevance of a revenue diversification 
strategy. State contingent markets are available to growers in some countries and for 
some commodities, while government policies also provide income support. Growers 
having access to these opportunities do not, however, make the decision to diversify 
merely to manage risk or stabilize cash flow; they take it as part of a package with rota-
tion effects and other merits. 
A further private motive for use of rotations is to better manage labor supply through 
the year, noted as a problem in monoculture crop agriculture in regions with thin labor 
markets (Saloutos 1946; Campbell et al. 1990). Soybeans and corn, for example, are 
sown and harvested over sufficiently distinct periods that growers can better utilize labor, 
with less reliance on contract sources. Winter and spring variants of wheat and barley 
also allow for this latitude. Indeed, the significance of seasonal labor constraints in agri-
culture is borne out by the belief among some historians that it contributed to the nature 
of industrialization in manufacture (Sokoloff and Dollar 1997) and the pressures toward 
agricultural mechanization (Musoke and Olmstead 1982; Whatley 1987).  
Rotation effects in practiced rotations can also be adverse, at least for some crops in 
the cycle. Intensive cultivation under one crop may leave compacted soils for the next, 
while late harvesting may impede preparation for the follow-up planting. Volunteer 
plants in subsequent years are weeds and may carry disease. Perhaps the strongest ad-
verse effect can be on accounting profit in some rotation years. Some rotation crops, such 
as oats throughout North America and spring barley in the Palouse region, are almost 
never grown in monoculture because market prices make it almost impossible to clear a 
profit over that part of the cycle. 
Rotation strategies are of interest to policymakers for a variety of reasons. The public 
is also concerned about maintaining land quality, while wind-born particles are a health 
hazard. Siltation of lakes reduces the value of environmental amenities, while siltation of 
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reservoirs and rivers require redress through public funds (Wang et al. 2002; Pimentel et 
al. 1995). The risk and extent of flooding can be reduced by the more varied landscape 
that exists under diverse cropping (Pimentel et al. 1995). Rotation choices are also seen to 
alter the use of agricultural chemicals, with attendant consequences for water quality (Wu 
et al. 2004).1  Rotations additionally can promote a more diverse ecosystem while reduc-
ing reliance on a chemical approach to pest management that may not be either efficient 
or sustainable (Cowan and Gunby 1996; Batra 1982). 
Because of concerns about global warming, participants in agricultural systems 
around the world may need to address their contributions to greenhouse gas emissions. 
The United States emitted about 1,580 million metric tons of CO2 in 2001, while Lal et 
al. (1999) estimate that the use of improved crop rotations and winter cover crops can 
mitigate this amount to the extent of about 5-15 million metric tons. When compared 
with afforestation, this approach is a low-cost approach to sequestration (but with limited 
sequestration potential) (Lewandrowski et al. 2004). 
Agricultural commodity policies inevitably have indirect implications for rotation 
strategies, but more recent policies in the United States and European Union have more 
directly targeted rotation strategies. Agri-environmental schemes were institutionalized in 
E.U. rules following the 1992 Common Agricultural Policy reforms. While implementa-
tion varies across countries, subsidies are commonly provided to encourage integrated 
farming practices that require less intensive use of market inputs, to facilitate the switch 
to organic farming, and to promote a picturesque landscape. The U.S. Food, Agricultural, 
Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990 provided funds to subsidize farm production prac-
tices that are not harmful to water quality. The 1996 U.S. farm bill extended the approach 
by funding the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) to subsidize voluntary 
conservation activities by farmers and ranchers. While the practices subsidized vary 
across the country, a targeted practice standard to be subsidized is that of conservation 
crop rotation in which a repeated sequence of crops is considered to promote environ-
mental goals. Commencing in 2004, a separate program that focuses on specific 
watersheds, called the Conservation Security Program, provides funds to entice growers 
into contracts that limit growing activities. Among the constraints are rotation restrictions 
that emphasize perennial crops in rotation. 
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Given the prevalence of rotations in global crop agriculture, a better understanding of 
the economics of rotation choices should prove to be very useful for commodity policy 
analysts. It should also be useful when analyzing the environmental economics of soil, 
water, rural amenities, and global warming. The advent of spatial information collection 
and allied techniques, such as global positioning technologies, the Erosion/Productivity 
Impact Calculator (Sharpley and Williams 1990), and the U.S. National Resources Inven-
tory data, allow for spatial analysis of likely and actual policy consequences. Newer 
technologies may also permit better monitoring of agricultural production practices. 
Thus, the need for an economic understanding of rotation choices is strong both to pro-
vide insights and to guide policy implementation. Yet research on the economics of crop 
rotation is quite limited. 
Linear programming techniques were quickly adapted to accommodate crop rotation 
effects (Koopmans 1951). While programming provides the means for empirical analysis, 
the framework does not appear to have been used to identify conceptual insights on the 
structure of rotations. Realizing that an understanding of dynamic interactions in dual 
analysis was needed to appreciate the role of incentives in such matter as soil capital for-
mation, Chambers and Lichtenberg (1995), Färe and Grosskopf (1996), and others have 
developed empirically implementable dynamic models of production. Jaenicke (2000) 
has applied the approach, providing evidence in favor of the claim that soil capital mat-
ters for corn and soybean production in Rodale, Pennsylvania. Thomas (2003) has 
implemented a model in which carry-over effects can be estimated using farm choices 
and in which the optimality of rotations can be tested. 
Stepping back from identifying rotation effects, the intent of the present paper is to 
ask what the consequences of given rotation effects are. Because the possible motives for 
rotation choice are many and interconnected, no single article could provide a compre-
hensive analysis. We confine attention to three general effects where the gains from 
specialization are opposed by some incentive to spread land across a variety of uses. We 
develop first a conceptual approach to identifying dominated rotations under input and 
output carry-over effects in the absence of risk aversion, and we identify rules of thumb 
for eliminating rotations. Under one-year rotation effects, the glue-on principle screens 
out the use of rotations by comparison with embedded rotations while the insert principle 
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discards rotations involving immediate replications. These effects are purely structural, 
and neither relies on prices. 
Under multi-year rotation effects, the sunk cost principle explores the roles of fertil-
ity accumulation and switching costs on length and composition of rotation. Working 
with rotations that have arbitrary rotation effects, the specialization principle invokes 
quasiconvexity in the objective function when seeking to maximize expected profit 
across rotation choices to identify the private optimality of monoculture. Both of these 
effects are price-dependent. The switching principle, which is price-independent, elimi-
nates rotations relative to permuted rotations.  
The second and third general effects that are studied concern gains from diversifica-
tion in the presence of conditions that predispose solutions toward the interior. Under risk 
aversion, much of the earlier analysis carries through but with some qualifications. Since 
linearity is broken, rotation and monoculture strategies may be mixed in an optimal land 
allocation. Labor use diversification is also an issue when rural labor markets are thin. 
Extending tools used in the analysis of risk preference effects, we model the extent of 
systemic correlations in demand for time across crops to identify when monoculture 
might apply. Neither effect necessarily requires crop rotations to rationalize diversifica-
tion because one can diversify by growing a portfolio of crops sown under monoculture. 
But if rotation effects are present, then risk and labor diversification effects can tip the 
balance away from monoculture. The paper concludes with some thoughts on further 
work in the area.  
 
Concepts 
One acre of land may be allocated to any among m  crops, each of which uses the 
land for one year.2 The crops are labeled , {1,2, ... , }i mu i m   . A monoculture rota-
tion using crop iu  is labeled as iu  . A rotation R  using 1iu  and then 2iu  and so on 
through 
ˆiu  is labeled as R   1 2 ˆ...i i iu u u  . If ku  is an entry in 1 2 ˆ...i i iu u u   then ku  is 
said to be in R , ku R , and we say that ku  is a letter in the rotation. An adjoining set of 
letters in a rotation is referred to as a sequence, that is, 
1 2ˆ i ii
u u u  is a three-letter sequence 
in R  where we have used the fact that the rotation is seamless and so 
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1 2 2 1ˆ ˆ
... ...i i i ii iu u u u u u     . Throughout, we will denote a rotation by the least sequence 
length before repetition, that is, 1 2u u   and not 1 2 1 2u u u u  . 
The planting time expectation of harvest time output prices are exogenous to the 
farm at ,i mP i , and these prices are fixed over time. Absent rotation effects, the output 
yields are ,i mq i . Absent rotation effects, the quantities of inputs used are ,i sx i , 
and all can be purchased in competitive markets at respective prices ,i sw i . Concate-
nating price vectors, the vector of all these prices is written as r  with arguments 1r  
through h m sr r    where the first m  arguments are output prices. The associated netput 
vector, with outputs listed first, is z . Absent any consideration of rotation effects, the 
profit from producing the iu  crop is ( ),iu mr i  . 
Rotation effects alter these profits, creating a jointness in production. We model rota-
tion effects as a location mapping in input-output space. For example, whereas the 
production function in a continuous corn rotation with applied nitrogen as the sole input 
might have been ( )cq f x , in a corn-after-soybean rotation it becomes ( ) 5cq f x   
because of a five-bushel yield boost due to rotation. Or the production function might be-
come ( 10) 5cq f x    where there is a 10 lb/acre nitrogen savings in addition to the 
five-bushel yield boost. For interior input choice solutions—and we make this assump-
tion throughout the paper—profit that an accountant ignoring rotation effects might 
attribute to corn increases by 5 10corn nitrogenP w  due to rotation effects. As we will show, 
whether these spillover yield and input effects persist for one or more years into the fu-
ture is important in determining what one can relate about the optimality of a particular 
rotation. We will develop our analysis first when spillover yield and input effects persist 
for one year (one-year memory), deferring the general case to later.  
 
One-Year Memory 
If the iu  crop is followed by the ju  crop in some rotation labeled R , then use the ro-
tation-conditioned year lag operation ( ; )L R  to label ( ; )i ju L u R . The spillover effect 
8 / Hennessy 
 
regarding tz , ht  , is written as | ( ; )j j
t
u L u R . The one-year memory is reflected in the fact 
that the effect does not depend upon crops before iu  in the rotation. A natural restriction 
applies to these | ( ; )j j
t
u L u R . When mt   and t j  then | ( ; ) 0j jtu L u R   regardless of rota-
tion. This restriction is merely to assert that wheat is not harvested in the year that alfalfa 
is grown in a wheat-alfalfa rotation.  
Accounting profit for the ju  crop following the iu  crop in rotation R  is  
 | ( ; )1( ) ; ( ; ).j j j
hu t
u L u R t i jtr r u L u R   	  (1) 
Average profit per year over the whole rotation is  
 
 | ( ; )11( ) ( ) ,| | j j jj
hu t
u L u R tu R t
V R r r
R
 
  
 	 	  (2) 
where | |R  is rotation length (years before rotation repeats) and 
ju R 	 sums across each 
letter entry in the sequence representing R . In this section we use equation (2) to ask, 
When can a rotation be ruled out given the availability of structurally similar but simpler 
rotations?  
Glue-On Principle 
Some consideration of the structure of a rotation identifies situations in which one 
can dispense with prices and yet remove a rotation from the relevant decision set. The 
main insight can be obtained upon making graphical depictions of two rotations. The left 
side of Figure 1 shows rotations 1 1 2 3R u u u    and 2 1 2 4 5 2 4 5 1R u u u u u u u u      . The time 
sequences of both rotations are to be read clockwise. The dotted curve segments show 
where new bonding will occur and the vertical bars show where bonds will be broken to 
allow for new bonds. Now consider rotation 3R   1 2 4 5 1 2 3u u u u u u u  , on the right side of 
Figure 1. This rotation is constructed from the simpler rotations by cutting both loops 1R  
and 2R  between 1u  and 2u , then adjoining the 1u  end from 1R  to the 2u  end from 2R  and 
the 1u  end from 2R  to the 2u  end from 1R . In order to see the relevance of this glue-on, a 
definition is needed. 
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embedding

1u

2u
3u
1u
2u
4u

 
1R
2R
3R
3u

 
4u
2u 1u
5u

5u

2u

1u
 
FIGURE 1. Rotation loops R1 and R2 are joined to make R3 
 
DEFINITION 1. Rotations 1R  and 2R  are said to be embedded in rotation 3R  if  
(a) 1R  and 2R  contain a common letter sequence ; ,i j mu u i j  , while  
(b) 3R  satisfies 3 1 2| | | | | |R R R   and contains all the letters in each of 1R  and 2R  in se-
quence, commencing at ju . 
 
Part (a) allows for the embedding to occur by breaking both rotations between ix  
and jx . Part (b) ensures that the embedding does occur and that no surplus letters are in-
troduced. Profits for rotations , {1,2}iR i , to be embedded are  
 
 | ( ; )11( ) ( ) .| | k k k ik i
hu t
i u L u R tu R t
i
V R r r
R
 
  
 	 	  (3) 
Take a weighted sum to obtain 
 
  
 3 31 2
1 2
1 2
3 3
| ( ; ) | ( ; )1 1
3 3
3
3
| | | |( ) ( )| | | |
1 1( ) ( )| | | |
1 ( ).| |
k k
k k k kk k
h hu ut t
u L u R t u L u R tu R t u R t
R RV R V R
R R
r r r r
R R
V R
R
   
     

   

	 	 	 	  (4) 
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Definition 1, parts (a) and (b), allows us to adapt the histories for 1R  and 2R  to that for 
3R  without losing step. The connections are seamless. But  
 
1 2
1 2 1 2
3 3
| | | |( ) ( ) max{ ( ), ( )},| | | |
R RV R V R V R V R
R R
   (5) 
so that the embedding rotation can have profit no larger than the largest among those of 
the embedded rotations.  
 
RESULT 1. (Glue-on principle) Under one-year memory, if 1R  and 2R  are embedded in 3R  
then 3R  is weakly dominated by either 1R  or 2R . 
 
EXAMPLE 1. Camara, Young, and Hinman (1999) provide case studies of six three-year 
crop rotations used in the Palouse region of Washington and Idaho states. Each involves 
winter wheat and at least one other cereal, while five also involve a legume (peas or len-
tils). Case study farms A and B use winter wheat (Ww) then spring barley (Sb) then peas 
(Pe) and Ww then Sb then spring wheat (Sw). If 1R WwSbPe   , 2R WwSbSw   , and 
3R WwSbPeWwSbSw   , then 3R  can be removed from consideration under one-year 
memory. Heady (1951) reports a field trial in Ohio with rotation Corn-Corn-Wheat-
Alfalfa-Alfalfa, which is an embedding of Corn-Alfalfa and Corn-Wheat-Alfalfa, and so 
can be ruled out because of Result 1 under one-year memory. Campbell et al. (1990) re-
port field trials that involve Fallow-Wheat-Wheat-Hay-Hay-Hay, where again Result 1 
and one-year memory identify domination. 
Duplicate Insertion Principle 
Application of Definition 1 requires a sequence of two letters common to two rota-
tions. Sometimes the idea of common sequences does not apply but the mechanism used 
to bond the two rotations remains relevant. When two rotations differ only by the inclu-
sion of a repeated letter then the repetition creates a redundancy in the conditions 
specified in Definition 1. 
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DEFINITION 2. If 1iu R  and i iu u  replaces a iu  in 1R  to generate rotation 2R  (so that 
2 1| | | | 1R R  ) then 2R  is said to be obtained from 1R  by duplicate insertion. 
 
With one-year memory, if a iu  is snipped out of 2R  then the remaining iu  bonds just 
as well as in 2R . Denoting a sequence i iu u  as U , suppose that ku  precedes i iu u  in 2R  so 
that3  
 

 

 
2 2
11
| |1 1
2 | ( ; )1
2 2
|2 1
| ( ; )1
2 2 2
2
1
2 2
2 ( )1( ) ( )| | | |
( )(| | 1) 1 ( )| | (| | 1) | |
(| | 1) 1( ) (| | | |
i
i i i kj
j j j
j
i
i ij
j jj
h hu t t
h u u t u u tu t t t
u R u L u R tt
u U
hu t
h u u tu t t
u L u R tu R t
i
r r r
V R r r
R R
r rR
r r
R R R
R V R V u
R R
  
 
 
 
   
 



  
 
  

  


  
	 		 	
		 	
1) max{ ( ), ( )}.iV R V u   
 (6) 
This observation allows us to assert the following.  
 
RESULT 2. (Duplicate insertion principle) Under one-year memory, if 2R  is obtained from 
1R  by duplicate insertion of iu  then 2R  is weakly dominated by either 1R  or iu  . 
 
EXAMPLE 2. Compare the two-crop corn-soybean rotation, CS  , with alternatives also 
sometimes used in the U.S. Corn Belt, CCS   and CCCS  . If one-year memory applies 
then Result 2 precludes both CCS   and CCCS  . Duplicate inserts also exist in the Ex-
ample 1 rotations from Heady (1951) and Campbell et al. (1990), so one may wonder 
whether one principle is subsumed. While Results 1 and 2 are strongly related, Result 1 
would not preclude the extended rotations CCS   and CCCS  . Similarly, Result 2 could 
not be used to rule out 3R  in Example 1. 
N-Year Memory 
The main, tedious, and important distinction between N-year memory and one-year 
memory is that operator (; )L R  is no longer dependent only on the last chosen crop but 
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rather on the last N crops. Results 1 and 2 adapt readily to the N-year memory context, 
and indeed to contexts where length of memory depends on the crop sequence.4 But the 
ability to identify dominance will typically be weakened. In what follows we illustrate 
with two-year memory only. Write |i j k
t
u u u  for the netput t rotation effects when growing 
crop iu  given that the immediate predecessor crop was ju  and ku  preceded that. 
 
EXAMPLE 3. Under two-year memory with yield effects only, consider the three rotations 
CS  , CCS  , and CCCS  . The last two rotations could be discarded under one-year 
memory by use of the duplicate insertion principle. Under two-year memory,  
 

 

 
| |
| | |
1( ) ( ) ( ) ;
2
1( ) 2 ( ) ( ) ;
3
1 3( ) ( ) ( ).
4 4
C S C S
C SC C S CS S
C S C C S
C SC C C CS C S CC S
V CS r r P P
V CCS r r P P P
V CCCS V C V CCS
   
    
     
      
       
 (7) 
Rotation CCCS   can be discarded because Result 2 applies under two-year memory if 
duplicate insertion is replaced by the idea of inserting a third consecutive year of the crop 
when the sequence had been just two consecutive years. But CCS   can dominate CS   
and C   under appropriate carry-over and price parameters. To verify this, assume that 
( ) ( )C Sr r   so that ( ) max{ ( ), ( )}V CCS V C V CS        whenever  
 | | | | | | | |(3 ) ; (2 ) (3 2 ) .S C C C C C S SS CC S C CC C SC C CS C C CS C SC C S CS S CC SP P P P              (8) 
Choices of   parameters and prices are readily identified such that both inequalities are 
satisfied.  
 
EXAMPLE 4. To show how involved price interactions can be under two-year memory, 
consider a three-crop rotation of length four. Crops A and C are grown once while crop B 
is grown twice. There are three such rotations: ABBC  , ABCB  , and ACBB  . For 
two-year memory and yield effects only, we seek to establish the maximum value among  
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| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
1( ) ( ) 2 ( ) ( ) ;
4
1( ) ( ) 2 ( ) ( ) ;
4
1( ) ( ) 2 ( ) ( )
4
A B C A B B C
A CB A B AC B B BA B C BB C
A B C A B B C
A BC A B AB B B CB B C BA C
A B C A B B C
A BB A B CA B B BC B C AB C
V ABBC r r r P P P P
V ABCB r r r P P P P
V ACBB r r r P P P P
      
      
      
        
        
         .
 (9) 
Because of profit function homogeneity, we may arbitrarily normalize one price without 
loss of insight. Let 1CP   so that the break-even lines are  
 
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | |
, : ( ) ( ) ;
, : ( ) ( ) ;
, : ( ) (
A A B B B B C C
A CB A BC A B AC B BA B AB B CB B C BA C BB
A A B B B B C C
A CB A BB A B AC B BA B CA B BC B C AB C BB
A A B
A BC A BB A B AB B C
ABBC ABCB P P
ABBC ACBB P P
ABCB ACBB P
       
       
   
          
          
       | | | |) .B B B C CB B CA B BC B C AB C BAP      
  (10) 
They are congruent: subtract the first from the second to obtain the third so that any solu-
tion to the first two also satisfies the third. With | | | |1
C C C C
C BA C BB C AB C BB       , 
| |
A A
A CB A BB  , | | 1
A A
A BC A BB    , | | | | 1
B B B B
B AC B BA B CA B BC       , and 
| | | |
B B B B
B AC B BA B AB B CB      , then ( ) ( )V ABBC V ABCB      implies 1AP  , 
( ) ( )V ABBC V ACBB      implies 1BP  , and  
( ) ( )V ABCB V ACBB      implies B AP P . When 1AP   and 1BP  , then ABBC   
dominates (weakly). When 1AP   and B AP P , then ABCB   dominates (weakly). The 
situation is depicted in Figure 2. These preferences are driven entirely by the imposed 
carry-over effects, and one could choose carry-over parameter values such that preferred 
rotations on these three regions in output price space were interchanged.  
 
EXAMPLE 5. (Sunk cost principle) As with the Sussex systems and some systems reported 
in Example 1, pasture and other perennial crops often enter a rotation. These crops may 
involve start-up (switching) costs because of low productivity in the first year, and 
switching costs will affect rotation structure. Suppose that crop A is perennial (pasture, 
alfalfa, etc.) while crop B is annual. Start-up costs for the crop amount to 0K  . There 
are no rotation effects concerning the productivity of crop A, but there is a multi-year 
productivity effect under crop B. Specifically, the first year of crop B production after  
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FIGURE 2. Choosing among permuted rotations 
 
1N   years of crop A receives ( )f N  additional yield, (1) 0f  , but the second and sub-
sequent years receive no additional yield. The rotation effect, ( )f N , is increasing but at 
a decreasing rate while ( )f N  is also bounded. Baseline crop A profit is A  while base-
line crop B profit is B , with A B   so that A would be the preferred crop absent 
rotation effects. 
Write the rotation where 1N   years of crop A are followed by one year of crop B, 
before the rotation starts over, as 1NA B   . The rotation has value 
 
1 ( 1) ( )( ) .
A B
N BN f N P KV A B
N
 
 
   
     (11) 
Differentiate, with the order indicated by the number of prime symbols, to obtain value 
1 1
2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
.
N A B A N
B B BdV A B K f N P f N P V A B f N P
dN N N N N
             
      (12)  
The first fraction at right must be negative for some positive natural number N  if rotation 
1( )NV A B    is to be chosen over specialization in A. Given A B  , this means that 
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( ) BK f N P  is required; otherwise rotation-effect gains in crop B would not outweigh the 
switching costs. The set of admissible N  are the positive natural numbers satisfying { :N  
( ) 0}A B BK f N P     . If the set is empty then there will never be an incentive to 
grow B in rotation. The set contracts as K  increases and, for given price levels, there ex-
ists a ceiling value of K  above which A   is preferred. The second fraction in (12) is 
positive, and represents the marginal revenue from increased fertility in B when averaged 
over all rotation years.  
A second differentiation gives  
 
2 1
2 3 2
( ) 2( ( ) ) ( ) ( )2 .
N B A
B B Bd V A B K f N P f N P f N P
dN N N N
        
     (13) 
This is negative at any point satisfying 1( ) / 0NdV A B dN    , so that local concavity ap-
plies. It is readily demonstrated that optimum N  increases with the level of K . Crop A 
becomes more prominent in the rotation as the start-up cost for crop A increases because 
A B  . The only motive for choosing B is the rotation effect so the start-up cost is at-
tributed to crop B rather than crop A. 
General Analysis of Rotation Effects 
Memory structure is not necessary for some conclusions to be made on optimal rota-
tion choices. Two are what we call the specialization principle and the switching 
principle. In addition, we comment on the role of price homogeneity on the structure of 
rotation choices and how subsidies can affect that structure. 
Specialization Principle 
Monoculture is largely about gains from specialization. These gains can come in 
many forms, including the consequences of stronger incentives to develop crop-specific 
human capital. The sort of specialization we consider here is not in any way dynamic. It 
refers to the circumstances under which rotation effects are insufficient to dominate the 
discretion to specialize in one particular crop. Write the maximum among monoculture 
profits for crops in rotation R  as  
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 ( ) max { ( )}.
iu R i
R V u
 
    (14) 
By the convexity and symmetry of the max{}  function in (14), an application of Jensen’s 
inequality provides5  
 
 |11 ˆ( ) max { ( )} ( ) ( ).| | ji j jj
hu t
u R i u u tu R t
R V u r r R
R
 
 
  
     	 	   (15) 
Specialization will certainly be preferred if the value ˆ( )R  defined in (15) exceeds ( )V R .  
Taking the difference, ˆ( ) ( ) ( )R R V R   , we obtain  
 | | ( ; )1 1
1( ) ( ) ( ),| | j j j jj
h ht t t
u u u L u R t tu R t t
R r r R
R
  
   
   	 	 	  (16) 
where 1 | | ( ; )( ) (| |) ( )j j j jj
t t t
u u u L u Ru R
R R   
 
 	 . The inference from the comparison may 
be summarized as follows. 
 
RESULT 3. (Separation principle) If 
1
( ) 0h ttt r R  	  then rotation R  is dominated by a 
monoculture rotation. 
 
Of course, the comparison cannot relate which crop, were it grown in monoculture, 
would dominate the rotation.  
 
EXAMPLE 6. For the two-crop corn-soybean rotation, CS   with C for corn, let 
| |
t t
C S S C    | | 0
t t
C C S S    for all inputs. In addition, restrictions | | 0
S C
C S S C    apply. 
With CP  and SP  as output prices, then | |( ) 0.5( )C C CC C C SCS       and 
| |( ) 0.5( )S S SS S S CCS      . Upon applying the normalization | | 0C SC C S S   , which only 
means that monoculture rotations are taken as the baseline for comparison, then 
| |1 ( )
h t C S
t C S C S C St
r CS P P  
 
    	 . If | 0CC S   and | 0SS C   under one-year memory, then 
the separation principle certainly does not apply so that one is no wiser on the admissibil-
ity of the rotation. If either of the carry-over yield effects is negative, then there exist 
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output price vectors such that the principle does apply and CS   can be ruled out at these 
price vector evaluations. 
Switching Principle 
Consider two rotations 1R  and 2R , that differ only by permutation. For example, let 
1R   1 2 3 4u u u u   and 2 1 4 3 2R u u u u   . The rotations are the same up to transposition 
2 4u u . The general expression for 2 1( ) ( )V R V R  is  
 
2 11
2 1 | ( ; ) | ( ; )1
1
1( ) ( ) ( ),| | j j j jj
h t t
t u L u R u L u Rt u R
V R V R r
R
 
   
  	 	  (17) 
where baseline profit disappears upon taking differences under the permutation attribute. 
An implication is Result 4. 
 
RESULT 4. (Convex cone property) Let 1R  and 2R  differ only by permutation. If 
2 1( ) ( )V R V R  at price vector hr    and also at price vector hr   , then 
2 1( ) ( )V R V R  at any price vector (1 ) , [0,1]r r      , any price vector , 0r   , 
and any price vector , 0r   .  
 
The result is immediate from taking convex set combinations in (17) and from scal-
ing vector r  in (17).  
 
EXAMPLE 7. Subsidies are used to encourage rotations in the European Union and the 
United States. To model the effects of such subsidies, let the per acre annual subsidy on 
the practice be 0   and restrict the choice set to { , , }CS C S      . When there are only 
yield effects due to rotation, when prices such that the grower is indifferent are allocated 
to the two-crop rotation, and when the normalization | | 0
C S
C C S S    is imposed, then the 
rotation choice is 
18 / Hennessy 
 
 
| |
| |
| |
if 2 | ( ) ( ) |;
if ( ) ( ) 2 ;
if ( ) ( ) 2 .
C S C S
C S C S C S
C S C S
C S C S C S
S C C S
C S C S C S
CS P P r r
C r r P P
S r r P P
    
    
    
     
     
     
 (18) 
Figure 3 depicts the regions. When 0  , then the (positive) prices that support 
| |
C S
C S C S C SP P   | ( ) ( ) |C Sr r    are in the wedge between two positively sloped rays 
from the origin.6 This is an illustration of Result 4. Without a subsidy, the convex combi-
nation of any two points in the cone labeled CS   must also be in the cone. Picking any 
point in the cone, all points on the ray from the origin and through it must also be in the 
cone. The subsidy shifts these rays in a parallel manner so as to expand the price set sup-
porting CS  . When a subsidy is employed, then the convex property still applies but the 
ray property fails.  
 
Returning to equation (17), let   be the set of permutations on 1R . So for 
1R ABC   , the set is { , }ABC ACB      while for 1R AAABBBB   , then 
{ , ,AAABBBB AABABBB      , , }AABBABB AABBBAB ABABABB      . Choose 
weightings ,R R  , on the unit simplex for each rotation in   and generalize (17) to  
 
 111 | ( ; ) | ( ; )1
1
1[ ( ) ( )] .| | j j j jj
h t t
R t R u L u R u L u RR t u R R
V R V R r
R
   
     
  	 	 	 	     (19) 
If there exist simplex weightings ,R R   such that 

 11 | ( ; ) | ( ; )j j j jj t tR u L u R u L u Ru R R        	 	    0 ht  , then a strategy that dominates 1R  on 
all land is to sow the land in proportions R  for each R . Thus a price-free condition 
on carry-over parameters for domination is 
 
RESULT 5. (Switching principle) 1R  is weakly dominated whenever there exist simplex 
weightings ,R R   such that 
 11 | ( ; ) | ( ; ) 0j j j jj t tR u L u R u L u R hu R R t         	 	   . 
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FIGURE 3. Output price space and prices supporting different rotations under a  
rotation subsidy 
 
 
In fact, however, the linearity of the model ensures that a portfolio of rotations will 
not be optimal. Result 5 is not constructive in that it does not identify a rotation that 
dominates 1R . The dominating rotations will usually depend upon prices. But if it so 
happened that the inequality were true for some 1R  , for example, return to (17) and 
suppose that 
2 11
| ( ; ) | ( ; )( ) 0j j j jj
t t
u L u R u L u Ru R
 
 
 	 , and then R  dominates 1R  for any posi-
tive prices.  
 
EXAMPLE 8. Let 1R ABCD   . All remaining permutations are 2R ADCB   , 
3R ABDC   , 4R ADBC   , 5R ACBD   , and 6R ACDB   . With one-year memory 
and || | |
i k i i
i j i j i k    , if there are only yield rotation effects and 1R  is to dominate all other 
permutations, then  
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| | | |
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
( 1 2) 0;
( 1 3) 0;
( 1 4) 0;
( 1 5) 0;
( 1 6) 0.
A B B C C D D A
A D A B A B C B C D C D
A C C D D B
A D A C B C D C D
A C B D D A
A D A B A B D C D
B C C A D B
B A B C B C D C D
A B B D C A
A D A B A B C B C
R R P P P P
R R P P P
R R P P P
R R P P P
R R P P P
   
  
  
  
  
   
  
  
  
  
 (20) 
For 
| | | | | | | | | |1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1
A A B B C C D D A D
A B A D B C B A C D C B D A D C A C D B                   , 
| |0, 0
B C
B D C A   , then Result 5 applies to ensure a sign on ( 1 2)R R  and on each of the 
other conditions also. In general the whole set of conditions reduces to  
 0; 0; 0; 0; 0;C D A C A B D C B CP P P P P P P P P P           (21) 
and is always satisfied for positive prices because the yield carry-overs for 1R  are very 
strong relative to those for the other rotations. 
However, if we only change | 1
A
A D   to | 1
A
A D   , then preference over rotations will 
have to be price dependent. In particular, (21) becomes  
 2 ; ; ; 0; 2 .C D A C A B D A C B C AP P P P P P P P P P P P         (22) 
Without searching on the interior of the simplex, it is clear that rotation ACBD   may be 
removed from further consideration regardless of the level of (positive) prices. We may 
continue looking for weights that support dominance of 1R  without needing to include 
5R  in the calculations.  
Risk Aversion Effect 
Among the more widely cited motives for use of rotation strategies is risk diversifi-
cation. We will investigate how rotation carry-over effects interact with diversification 
effects under the expected utility framework and one-year memory when the choice set is 
{ , , }A B AB      . Harvest output prices are the random variables AP  and BP , where we 
will specify distribution assumptions shortly. Were a grower’s whole farm devoted to A 
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(or B), then output would be Aq  ( Bq ) and costs would be Ac  ( Bc ). The fraction of total 
area devoted to A is [0,1] . 
Rotation effects are confined to yield effects, these being |
A
A B  and |
B
B A  as defined 
previously. AA and BB carry-over effects are normalized to zero. If (0,0.5) , then A 
will always follow B whenever | 0
A
A B   and | 0
B
B A  , land will never switch use crop-to-
crop whenever | 0
A
A B   and | 0
B
B A  , and we cannot be sure of strategy allocation 
choices when the inequalities differ in direction. Assume that the carryover effects are 
positive, | 0
A
A B   and | 0
B
B A  , so that the stochastic harvest-date payoff is 
 | |( ) ( ) ( )(1 ) min[ ,1 ]( ).A BA A A B B B A A B B B AP q c P q c P P                    (23) 
The increasing and concave utility function is [ ( )]U  , the expectation operator over 
harvest prices is { }E  , and the planting date objective function is  
 [0,1]( ) max { [ ( )]}.V R E U       (24) 
It is convenient to break the problem in two, writing 
 [0,0.5] | |
[0.5,0] | |
( ) max{ ( ;[0,0.5]), ( ;[0.5,1])};
( ;[0,0.5]) max { [( ) ( )(1 )]};
( ;[0.5,1]) max { [( ) ( )(1 )]}.
A B
A A A A A B B B A B B B
A B
A A A B B B A A B B B A
V R V R V R
V R E U P q c P P P q c
V R E U P q c P q c P P
 
 
   
   
 
 

      
      
   
   
  (25) 
We seek to establish conditions such that the optimal cropping strategy is clear. Define 
Y   | |(0.5) 0.5 ( ) 0.5 ( ) 0.5 0.5A BA A A B B B B A A BP q P q c c         , (0) B B BX P q c     , 
and Z   (1) A A AP q c   , and then remove the action constraints: 
 
( ;[0,0.5]) max { [ (1 )]};
( ;[0.5,1]) max { [ (1 )]}.
i
ii
i i
ii ii
W R E U X Y
W R E U Y Z
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
  (26) 
The first-order conditions for the unconstrained problems are  
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(27 ) ( ;[0,0.5]) : { [ (1 )]( )} 0;
(27 ) ( ;[0.5,1]) : { [ (1 )]( )} 0;
i i
ii ii
i W R E U X Y X Y
ii W R E U Y Z Y Z
 
 
    
    
   
   
  (27) 
but it is the corner solutions for the constrained problems that are of interest. In this re-
gard, two definitions are in order. Define the harmonic mean of, say, Y , as 
( ) { [ ] }/ { [ ]}H Y E U Y Y E U Y     , as in Kijima 1997 or in McEntire 1984. Then, define as 
follows.7 
 
DEFINITION 3. (Shaked and Shanthikumar 1994, p. 118) Random variables AP  and BP  are 
said to be associated if 1 2 1 2{ ( , ) ( , )} { ( , )} { ( , )}A B A B A B A BE G P P G P P E G P P E G P P         for all 
non-decreasing functions 1( , )A BG P P   and 2( , )A BG P P   such that the expectations exist. 
 
This is a generalized form of correlation, and it does require that AP  bear a positive 
linear correlation with BP . Positive association between these random variables is reason-
able because commodity prices tend to covary positively. In the use we put the concept to, 
association ensures that diversification is not so effective that a mildly risk-averse individ-
ual could be coaxed out of the decision under risk neutrality into some of an investment 
that accrues large losses in expectation. Concerning corner and interior solutions, some 
analysis demonstrates that the situations in which * (0,1)i   and * (0,1)ii  , where 
* (0,1)i   and * 0ii  , and also in which * 1i   and * (0,1)ii   may all be ruled out under 
association and positive rotation carry-over effects. There are six remaining possible cases, 
and only four are essentially distinct. The distinct cases are as follows. 
Case 1: * *0, 1i ii   . From (27), this means that ( ) { [ ] }/ { [ ]}H Y E U Y X E U Y      
and ( ) { [ ] }/ { [ ]}H Y E U Y Z E U Y     . By the association property on AP  and BP , 
both of these conditions are certainly satisfied whenever 
( ) max[ { }, { }]H Y E X E Z   . Since the problems in (26) are convex in the choice 
variable, ( ) max[ { }, { }]H Y E X E Z    ensures that the acreage allocation decision 
is entirely to AB  . 
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Case 2: * *1, 0i ii   . This occurs when { [ ] }/ { [ ]} ( )E U Z Y E U Z H Z       and 
( ) { [ ] }/ { [ ]}H X E U X Y E U X     . In this case, monoculture is assured. Due to as-
sociation, both of these conditions apply if min[ ( ), ( )] { }H X H Z E Y   . The crop 
that is grown is the one that maximizes expected utility under monoculture.  
Case 3: * *1, 1i ii    (symmetrically: * *0, 0i ii   ). In this case, X  dominates 
any convex combination of X  and Y  while Y  dominates any convex combina-
tion of Y  and Z  so that all acres are sown under B  . The conditions may be 
written as ( ) { [ ] }/ { [ ]}H X E U X Y E U X      and ( ) { [ ] }/ { [ ]}H Y E U Y Z E U Y     . 
Under association, the pair of inequalities ( ) { }H X E Y   and ( ) { }H Y E Z   en-
sure that monoculture under B is chosen. In the symmetric case, sufficient 
conditions that monoculture under A is chosen are that association applies to-
gether with ( ) { }H Z E Y   and ( ) { }H Y E X  . 
Case 4: * *(0,1), 1i ii    (symmetrically: * *0, (0,1)i ii   ). Given the solution to 
the first problem, we can assert that a convex combination of B   and AB   is 
preferred to AB  . The solution to the second problem shows that AB   is pre-
ferred to A   or any interior convex combination of A   and AB  . Thus, the 
solution is to choose a convex combination of B   and AB  . Under the symmet-
ric case, it is optimal to choose a convex combination of A   and AB  .  
 
Function ( )H   is just the standard expectation when the utility function describes 
risk neutrality and then the decisions reduce to those described earlier in this paper. 
Clearly, an understanding of how the degree of risk aversion affects function ( )H   would 
be useful. For the pair of utility functions ˆ ( )U   and ( )U   and for random variable  , 
write the respective harmonic means as ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) { ( ) }/ { ( )}H E U E U         and 
( ) { ( ) }/ { ( )}H E U E U          . Find the difference, insert the irrelevant parameter  , 
and rearrange to obtain  
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ˆ ˆ1 ( ) { ( )}
ˆ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
ˆ ( ) { ( )}{ ( )}
U E UH H E U
U E UE U
 
    
 
         !   " #$ %
          (28) 
If ˆ ( ) / ( )U U     is an increasing function, then ˆ ˆ( ) / ( ) { ( )}/ { ( )}U U E U E U            
crosses from negative value to positive value at some   value, and we set this value as 
 . Since the product of terms inside the large parentheses in (28) is always non-negative, 
it follows that ˆ ( ) ( )H H     whenever ˆ ( ) / ( )U U     is increasing, that is, 
ˆ ˆ( ) / ( ) ( ) / ( )U U U U              . So we can be sure that ( )H   is not much smaller than 
{ }E   when the coefficient of risk aversion on the utility function entering ( )H   is nega-
tive but close to zero. 
This observation allows us to summarize the earlier case analysis. Given statistical 
association between variables AP  and BP , if a risk-neutral individual has strict preference 
among { , , }A B AB      , then the introduction of a small level of risk aversion will not 
change the preference. As the level of risk aversion increases, though, a switch to mixing 
monoculture with rotation (Case 4) or a switch to another choice among { , , }A B AB       
can occur. Thus, risk aversion can explain the rotation CCS   in Example 2 even when 
one-year memory applies. 
 
Time Rationing 
A further motive for use of rotations is workload management. The argument is that 
different crops have different seasonal workload requirements, and so growing a mix of 
crops could be more efficient than specialization. The motive concerns competing de-
mands for resources (time, versatile machinery, working capital, etc.) and not temporal 
spillovers in crop productivity. To evaluate the argument, we ignore risk and introduce a 
seasonal labor cost function but otherwise adopt the model in the previous section.  
There are J  seasons in the year, and the seasons are denoted as Jj  . The cost of 
hiring T  units of labor in any season is [ ]C T , a twice continuously differentiable, in-
creasing, and convex function. One acre can be allocated across crops { , }A B . The ith 
crop profit per acre before time costs is i , and land share   is devoted to crop A. The 
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time requirement of the ith crop in season j  is 
,i jt . Annual profit is  
 
| |
, ,
( ) (1 ) min[ ,1 ]( ) [ ( )];
( ) (1 ); 0;
J
A B A B
A A B B B A jj
j A j B j
V P P C T
T t t
         
   
  
      
   
	
  (29) 
Breaking the optimization problem in two, write 
 
[0,0.5] | |
[0.5,1] |
(30 ) max ( ) (1 ) [ ( )];
(30 ) max ( )(1 ) [ ( )].
J
J
A A B B
A A B B B A jj
A B A
B B A A B jj
i P P C T
ii P q P C T
 
 
      
     
 
  
  
    
    
	
	
  (30) 
At this point, the analysis can proceed much as for the study of risk aversion. Conditions 
can be specified such that each of Cases 1 through 4 occurs. 
We close with a point on the role of correlation among crop labor demands. To make 
explicit how labor requirement schedules affect the optimal solution, suppose that 
[ ]jC T   20.5 , 0jT	 	  . Using notation 1, , ,
J
i k i j k jjJ t t

 
 
 	 , suppose that A B   and 
| | 0
A B
A B B A    so that rotation effects are absent and there is no bias in baseline profits. 
Then the two sub-problems merge so that * * *[ ]ii ii     and  
 
, ,*
, , ,
.
2
B B A B
A A B B A B

 



 
 



 
 (31) 
Differentiation with respect to 
,A B
  provides 
* *
, , ,
/ 0.5
sign sign
A B B B A Ad d 
 
 
     . If 
two enterprises give equal profits, apart from seasonal labor costs, that are increasing, 
convex and quadratic, then an increase in the correlation between the labor needs of the 
two pushes the optimal allocation decision toward the one already favored. Note that the 
corner solution * 1   is supported whenever 
, ,A B A A
 
  and this is possible; the 
Schwartz inequality (Rudin 1976) only requires that 2
, , ,A A B B A B
 
 
  for variables that are 
not perfectly linearly correlated. If 
,A B
   ,A A
  then ,B B
  is large. Crop B provides little 
in the way of labor requirement diversification so that the labor costs of this enterprise 
are prohibitive. In general equilibrium, and if this farm’s experience is typical, one might 
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expect an increase in BP  such that some growers are willing to meet demand. If , 0A B
   
(a violation of statistical association), then there will be no corner solutions to (31) be-
cause the crop mix is very effective at stabilizing labor demand while other economic 
parameters are not such that they promote specialization.  
 
Conclusion 
Recognizing the importance of crop rotation for private profit and public policy, the 
intent of this paper has been to investigate some economics behind the choice. Our main 
model has provided some rules of thumb for choosing among rotations. General insights 
are that rotation carry-over can support quite involved rotations only if monoculture prof-
its are narrowly dispersed and carry-over effects persist for several years. One exception 
is the case in which substantial fixed costs are incurred to initiate a crop while carry-over 
fertility effects on a secondary crop accumulate to a significant level over several years. 
Then a dominant crop may be rotated with occasional planting of the secondary crop. 
Things are not quite so straightforward under risk aversion in the presence of uncertainty 
because rotation and diversification effects can trade off such that mixing monoculture 
with rotations may occur. We also show that monoculture and mixing monoculture with 
rotations can be motivated by time rationing among crops. 
We have noted in passing several other motives for choosing monoculture but have 
not developed the arguments. Nor have we engaged in any empirical studies to discrimi-
nate between motives. These are the logical next steps. The inavailability of commercial 
cropping choice data attached to relevant farm-level technology data may have been re-
sponsible in part for a paucity of research on the economics of rotation decisions to date.8 
Governmental data efforts in recent years, together with technical advances in the gather-
ing and analysis of information, hold promise for discerning the relative importance of 
factors in determining rotation choices.
  
Endnotes 
1. For the Upper Mississippi River Basin, Wu et al. (2004) found subsidies on rotations 
to have only a weak effect in altering practices to reduce run-off pollution. 
2. Throughout, we assume that one crop is grown per year. This is a convenience to 
economize on the use of notation. 
3. The U  identifies just one i iu u  sequence in the rotation. A second sequence i iu u  in 
the same rotation is not represented by U . 
4. For example, nitrogen requirements for crop A may depend upon the two preceding 
crops. Crop B may have a different root system so that the nitrogen requirement de-
pends only upon the preceding crop. 
5. For example, 
1 2 2 1 1 2max{ ( ), ( )} max{ ( ), ( )} max{ ( ), ( )}V u V u V u V u V u V u                
2 1(1 ) max{ ( ), ( )}V u V u    
1 2 2 1max{ ( ) (1 ) ( ), ( ) (1 ) ( )}V u V u V u V u                . Then set 1/ | | 0.5R   . 
6. Linear homogeneity of the profit function ensures that the partitioning curves are rays. 
7. Association is weaker, i.e., less restrictive, than the affiliation assumption that is widely 
used in auction theory (Shaked and Shanthikumar 1994, p. 254; Milgrom 1989). 
8. Innovations in remote imaging allow reliable detection of agricultural subsidy fraud 
in which planting decisions are misrepresented (Mitchener 2004). 
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